Teetering on the edge of diplomatic downgrade and outright severance, India-Pakistan relations plunged into freefall following the 22 April tourist attack in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). Citing Pakistan’s alleged role in the violence in the Valley, India’s Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) responded with measures signalling a freeze on political, cultural, and diplomatic engagement. Retaliatory steps were subsequently announced by Pakistan following its National Security Committee (NSC) meeting on April 24, marking a departure from traditional crisis management and indicating a shift in its diplomatic posture.
The Simla Agreement
Setting aside the legal mechanisms of the Indus Waters Treaty, this analysis focuses on the potential erosion of the Simla Agreement. Signed in July 1972 by then Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Pakistan’s Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in Himachal Pradesh, the pact followed the conclusion of the 1971 war, which resulted in Pakistan’s defeat and the creation of an independent Bangladesh. The agreement committed both nations to resolving all disputes-most notably Kashmir-through bilateral negotiations, while explicitly eschewing the use of force or unilateral measures. It also transformed the ceasefire line in J&K into the Line of Control (LoC), which both parties agreed not to alter unilaterally, regardless of differing political or legal interpretations.
Archival accounts reveal that the final agreement was preceded by a private dinner hosted by the then Indian Prime Minister, followed by intense late-night discussions stretching into the early hours. The two leaders ultimately reached a compromise and signed the agreement post-midnight, following reports of last-minute amendments and handwritten notes in the margins. While Kashmir was discussed, the primary emphasis remained on bilateralism and peaceful dialogue-principles increasingly rare in India-Pakistan diplomacy today.
However, here lies the caveat: Pakistan has historically deviated from the bilateralism framework, which obliges both parties to resolve disputes “by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations without any third-party mediation.” Over the years, Pakistan has appealed to international forums and the global community-such as the United Nations, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and the International Court of Justice (ICJ)-citing India’s unwillingness to engage in substantive dialogue. Following the Indian Parliament’s abrogation of Article 370 of the Constitution in 2019, Pakistan downgraded diplomatic relations and sought international intervention, despite India’s firm stance against third-party involvement.
Nonetheless, there have been moments of adherence to the agreement during brief periods of relative calm. For instance, the 2003 and 2021 LoC ceasefire agreements were reaffirmed without the overt involvement of third parties; according to reports, the United Arab Emirates facilitated secret discussions that enabled the 2021 agreement between the two neighbours.
This consistent internationalisation of bilateral issues reflects a deliberate strategy by Pakistan – placing bilateral accords in abeyance while selectively invoking certain provisions. Meanwhile, India has been accused of taking unilateral measures in Kashmir, particularly the revocation of the region’s special status in 2019, which it asserts is an “internal matter.” While the Simla Agreement has been selectively upheld or strategically marginalised depending on political and security contexts, its formal disregard represents a symbolic demonstration of the current nadir in bilateral relations.
The LoC – Symbol of Fragile Diplomacy and Stability
Another significant element of the Simla Agreement was the formal establishment of the LoC as a mutually recognised boundary, with both nations pledging not to alter it unilaterally. Technically, the 2008 Mumbai attacks, carried out by the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), could be interpreted as a violation of the clause prohibiting the encouragement of hostile acts. However, Pakistan’s consistent denials of involvement-despite the presentation of substantial evidence-have perpetuated a degree of strategic ambiguity.
The LoC is more than a demarcation line; it stands as a fragile but vital trust-building mechanism between the adversaries. Its abandonment sets a dangerous precedent, potentially catalysing a volatile cycle of conflict and altering the status quo. The erosion of decades of diplomatic groundwork would severely undermine the foundational framework that has deterred the two countries from engaging in full-scale war since 1972. Despite frequent violations of ceasefire agreements, the LoC has provided a stabilising function, particularly following the renewal of the 2021 ceasefire. In this context, its disregard not only threatens the concept of “limited war” but also deepens the trust deficit, eroding even the appearance of cooperation. Without clear ground rules for military engagement and a mutual understanding of territorial boundaries, the likelihood of strategic miscalculations increases considerably.
The path of diplomacy between the two nuclear-armed neighbours remains fraught with uncertainty. While recent developments indicate a clear erosion of the bilateral framework, India remains firmly opposed to third-party mediation – further widening the chasm between the two countries and diminishing the prospects for a meaningful resolution in the foreseeable future.
(The author is Research Analyst, Pakistan Desk, Takshashila Institution)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author
