India’s quest to shape the Indian Ocean is fundamentally a project of aligning geography, history, and strategic aspiration. The Indian Ocean touches more than 7,500 km of India’s coastline, surrounds its island territories from Lakshadweep to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and carries the majority of India’s trade and energy supplies.
For New Delhi, acquiring a position of maritime dominance is neither optional nor symbolic; it is a necessary condition for safeguarding national security, sovereignty, and global stature. Yet this ambition unfolds in a maritime theatre marked by intense competition, structural constraints, and geopolitical fragmentation.
From Tacit Influence to a Contested Domain
For much of the twentieth century, Indian strategic thinking regarded the Indian Ocean as India’s inherent sphere of influence. Even as external powers—especially the United States—maintained strong naval presence during the Cold War, India believed its geography, civilizational legacy, and regional relationships naturally granted it a privileged position.
The articulation of the SAGAR doctrine (Security and Growth for All in the Region) in the last decade reflected India’s desire to convert this broad idea into a practical strategy of maritime leadership. But the Indian Ocean of the twenty-first century is densely contested. Great power rivalry has intensified, global shipping routes have acquired unprecedented importance, and regional states increasingly hedge between competing partners. India, therefore, seeks dominance at a moment when uncontested primacy has become far more elusive.
China’s Expanding Maritime Reach
China’s entry into the Indian Ocean has disrupted India’s strategic calculus more than any other factor. What began as a network of commercial ports under the Belt and Road Initiative has transformed into a more formidable “String of Pearls”—a connected set of dual-use infrastructure capable of supporting Chinese naval operations.
Beijing’s military base in Djibouti, its stronghold in Gwadar, influence in Hambantota, and access routes through Myanmar and the Maldives collectively signify more than mere economic presence. Regular appearances of Chinese warships, submarines, and research vessels in the Indian Ocean represent a shift from episodic deployments to persistent power projection.
For India, this raises strategic anxieties on three fronts: the possibility of encirclement that could threaten sea lanes and naval assets; the erosion of Indian influence in neighbouring capitals; and the emergence of a rival’s maritime domain awareness in waters India considers sensitive. Chinese ambitions have turned the Indian Ocean into a primary arena of Asian power politics, complicating New Delhi’s long-held strategic assumptions.
India’s Maritime Capabilities and Aspirations
India has responded to this challenge by accelerating its own blue-water transformation. The Indian Navy remains the most capable indigenous maritime force in the region, equipped with aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, and a growing suite of advanced surface vessels and surveillance systems. Naval deployment patterns reflect increasing emphasis on presence operations, humanitarian assistance, anti-piracy missions, and capacity-building for smaller Indian Ocean states.
At the policy level, India has framed itself as a “net security provider,” undertaking initiatives such as SAGAR, the Maritime India Vision 2047, and port-modernisation programmes that integrate naval security with commercial opportunities. Major exercises with regional navies and enhanced coastal security frameworks underscore India’s determination to be the first responder to crises across these waters.
Economically, projects like Sagarmala and major port expansions aim to make India a pivotal node in global supply chains. These reforms are intended not merely to modernize logistics but to reinforce India’s identity as a maritime power, rather than a predominantly continental one.
Partnerships with Limits: The West’s Cautious Support
India’s growing alignment with the United States and major European democracies appears, at first glance, to provide a major boost to its Indian Ocean ambitions. Foundational defence agreements and joint exercises have enhanced operational coordination and access to strategic bases.
Yet these partnerships have structural boundaries. The United States remains principally focused on the Western Pacific and China’s military rise in East Asia; the Indian Ocean is only a part of a larger Indo-Pacific picture for Washington. European involvement, though significant in terms of naval presence and basing rights, fluctuates according to domestic priorities and global crises. Crucially, India’s steadfast commitment to strategic autonomy prevents it from joining any rigid security alliance that undermines its freedom to engage with multiple global actors.
Thus, Western powers act as enhancers of Indian capability but not as guarantors of Indian dominance. Their support is conditional, selective, and aligned with their own broader strategic agendas.
A Divided Global South and the Politics of Hedging
India positions itself as a leader of the Global South, yet the maritime sphere reveals a far more fragmented picture. Many Indian Ocean littoral and island states—such as Sri Lanka, Maldives, and several African coastal nations—opt for hedging strategies that balance ties with India, China, Gulf powers, and others. Economic dependencies, domestic political calculations, and pragmatic foreign policy considerations often overshadow ideological alignment with India.
While India leads multilateral initiatives and advocates cooperation on the blue economy, climate resilience, and maritime security, these diplomatic platforms have limited capacity to consolidate geopolitical loyalty. The Indian Ocean is not a two-sided chessboard; rather, it is a marketplace of influence where actors seek maximum benefits from all available suitors.
Domestic Constraints and Institutional Challenges
Beyond geopolitics, India faces internal limitations that complicate its leadership aspirations. The Navy must compete with the Army and Air Force for resources in a country where continental threats and large-scale welfare needs dominate political attention. Delays in shipbuilding, technology acquisition, and defence indigenization slow the pace of maritime modernization.
Furthermore, maritime governance within India remains fragmented across multiple ministries and coastal authorities. Harmonizing defence strategy, port development, fisheries management, and blue economy initiatives into a coherent national maritime doctrine is still a work in progress. Dominance requires not only naval strength but also coordinated economic and regulatory power.
Dominance Reimagined: From Control to Stewardship
Achieving absolute maritime dominance in the Indian Ocean—defined as full control over sea lanes, ports, and regional security—is increasingly unrealistic in a multipolar world. India’s emerging view is that stewardship and preponderance, rather than exclusivity, constitute a feasible and effective form of leadership.
This approach emphasizes ensuring the security of India’s territorial and economic interests, maintaining decisive influence in regional decision-making, and shaping norms and institutional frameworks that favour a free, open, and rules-based maritime order. If India becomes the preferred partner for security cooperation and crisis response, dominance will be exercised not through coercion but through legitimacy and trust.
Toward Responsible Primacy
India’s pursuit of maritime power in the Indian Ocean reflects a deep and necessary reorientation of national strategy. Geography compels India to be a maritime power; economics demands it; and geopolitics increasingly requires it. The SAGAR vision, naval modernization, diplomatic outreach, and blue economy reforms collectively demonstrate that India is serious about its role as a maritime guardian.
Yet the Indian Ocean today is crowded with powerful actors, each vying for access, influence, and strategic advantage. China’s assertive presence, the conditional nature of Western support, and the divergent trajectories of the Global South mean that India’s leadership will be contested, negotiated, and always unfinished.
A balanced and realistic appraisal suggests that India can indeed shape the future of the Indian Ocean—by pursuing stewardship rather than hegemony, by aligning economic power with naval reach, and by crafting partnerships grounded in mutual benefit rather than dominance. If New Delhi sustains this trajectory, the phrase “Guardians of the Blue Waters” may ultimately evolve from aspiration to an enduring description of India’s maritime destiny.
